Today marks 26 years since the signing of the Military Technical Agreement at the Kumanovo military airbase in North Macedonia, formally ending the NATO bombing campaign against the then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Yet, the presence of NATO in the Western Balkans and the question of its enlargement remain central issues in Europe’s security and political landscape.
The agreement followed 11 weeks of air strikes and five days of negotiations. It was signed by representatives of the FRY and NATO-led international security forces (KFOR): Yugoslav Army and Interior Ministry generals Svetozar Marjanović and Obrad Stevanović, and British General Michael Jackson on behalf of NATO.
A day later, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which remains the key international legal framework on the Kosovo issue. On June 12, 1999, just two days after the agreement, Russian troops entered the Pristina airport as part of the international contingent, relocating from their base in Ugljevik, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
British troops arrived the same day, triggering a tense standoff over control of the Slatina airbase between NATO and Russian forces—an incident resolved only months later, when NATO assumed full control in mid-October 1999. The Russian KFOR contingent withdrew from Kosovo in 2003.
Peace or Capitulation
At the time, then-president Slobodan Milošević declared peace in a public address, although to this day, the event is widely interpreted as a form of capitulation, albeit an „incomplete“ one.
Officials, particularly from Serbia’s security sector, have for years rejected that notion, emphasizing that no territory or armed forces were surrendered to the opposing side. Among them, former police general Obrad Stevanović, one of the agreement’s signatories, stated in an RTS interview that labeling the outcome as capitulation was inaccurate.
For Kosovo Albanians, the date marks the „liberation of Kosovo,“ while for many Kosovo Serbs, June 1999 signaled the beginning of an exodus—accompanied by ethnically motivated crimes, displacement, and abandonment of the province.
The Kumanovo Agreement mandated the complete withdrawal of all Yugoslav and Serbian military and security forces, including the army, air force, border police, intelligence services, and special police units, with the potential for a return of Serbian personnel pending KFOR approval—an article never implemented and rarely mentioned in Kosovo or Western narratives.
The agreement also established security zones: a 25 km air safety zone and a 5 km wide ground safety zone running along the boundary line, totaling 382 km. The air safety zone was lifted in 2015, and upper airspace was reopened for civilian traffic in 2014.
From Former Enemies to Tactical Coordination
Today, cooperation between the Serbian Armed Forces and KFOR operates on two levels—strategic (between KFOR commanders and the Serbian General Staff) and local (coordination and liaison). Joint Commission meetings are held regularly to share information and respond to incidents within both zones.
Serbia is a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Kosovo joined the same body as an associate member last year—symbolically, on the anniversary of the 1999 NATO campaign.
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008. Recognition remains contested, with estimates placing the number of recognitions around 100. So far in 2025, Kosovo has been recognized by two more countries: Sudan and Kenya.
Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) are undergoing a 10-year transformation (2016–2026) into the “Kosovo Army”—a process supported by individual NATO members such as the U.S., UK, Turkey, Germany, Italy, Albania, and Croatia, despite the name remaining unchanged. As this transformation nears its conclusion, cooperation with Western partners has deepened.
However, under a 2013 agreement between Kosovo and NATO, the KSF is not permitted to operate in the north without prior approval from the KFOR commander—a stipulation that remains in force.
Recently, the KSF signed a military cooperation agreement with Albania and Croatia in March of this year. Despite being excluded from a major joint NATO exercise in 2024 due to EU sanctions, the KSF hosted Defender Europe 2025, NATO’s largest multinational military exercise, proposed by the U.S. The drill concluded today, involving 25,000 troops, including 1,000 from the KSF.
Coinciding with the 26th anniversary of the Kumanovo Agreement, a new joint exercise, Golden Sword 2025, begins today with the participation of KFOR, EULEX, and the Kosovo Police.
Renewed Crises and Security Tensions
In late 2022, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić requested KFOR’s approval to deploy Serbian troops to Kosovo—a request officially denied on Orthodox Christmas Eve 2023. The exact response remains undisclosed, but Vučić confirmed it was negative.
Analysts saw the move as a domestic political gesture. The request was followed by a series of Serbian troop deployments near the administrative boundary line, at a time when fresh crises emerged in northern Kosovo.
In May 2023, violent clashes broke out in Zvecan between local Serbs and KFOR soldiers. The confrontation left 93 NATO troops injured—the largest such incident since 1999.
Later that year, in September, a deadly armed clash occurred in the village of Banjska, involving an armed Serb group and Kosovo Police. Four people were killed, and weapons worth an estimated €5 million were seized. Milan Radoičić, a senior Kosovo Serb figure, claimed responsibility. The incident drew harsh criticism and was seen as a major political and security blow to Serbia’s standing.
NATO has since repeatedly emphasized the need to bring all perpetrators to justice.
Serbia withdrew additional troops shortly after Banjska and has not repositioned forces near Kosovo since.
A separate incident occurred in November 2024, involving sabotage of the Ibar-Lepenac water canal in Donje Varage, disrupting drinking water supplies across Kosovo. Kosovo officials blamed the Serbian state, President Vučić, and Milan Radoičić—claims strongly denied by Belgrade. The international community urged a thorough investigation before assigning blame.
Unlike Banjska, NATO has remained more cautious, treating the canal sabotage and the Banjska attack as separate events.
„We made it clear that it is essential to establish the facts, hold those responsible accountable, and bring them to justice. Ensuring accountability is crucial, and the Kosovo Police is in the lead for the investigation. While the facts are being established, it is important to avoid inflammatory rhetoric and actions that could raise tensions, as this would be detrimental to security and stability in Kosovo and the region,” said KFOR Commander General Enrico Barduani after the sabotage.
From Security to Political Agreements
Over the past 26 years, agreements between Belgrade and Pristina have evolved from military and security arrangements to political and technical frameworks.
From UNSC Resolution 1244 to the Ahtisaari Plan (rejected by Serbia), the Brussels Agreement, the Washington Agreement, and most recently, the EU-facilitated Agreement on the Path to Normalization— calls for a so-called final normalization agreement are becoming increasingly explicit.
While implementation remains a key stumbling block—especially regarding the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM)—the latest agreement is, by many accounts, being implemented more consistently.
Evidence lies in the near-complete dismantling of Serbian institutions in Kosovo’s north and Serb-majority areas south of the Ibar over the past two years, including institutions providing basic social services.
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