On the Five Points of Belgrade: Laws Against Independence

By Dragutin Nenezić

A few days ago, the Government of the Republic of Serbia approved two draft laws implementing the second and fourth points of the „plan“ outlined in September this year: the Law on Designating Kosovo and Metohija (KiM) as a Region of Special Social Protection and the Law on the Organization and Jurisdiction of Judicial Authorities in the Prosecution of Crimes Committed in the Territory of KiM.

In this article, I will briefly review both proposals, as well as a few related events that have occurred since my last text on this topic.

Given that both draft laws are relatively short and straightforward, making them easy to read, I will focus this analysis on the key provisions and their relationship to the „plan.“

The First Proposal

The first draft law declares the territory of KiM as a special social protection region, defining the categories of individuals eligible for benefits under this designation and outlining those benefits—financial assistance for unemployed and elderly persons, along with other benefits the government may establish through special programs.

Conditions for accessing these benefits are specifically outlined, including the process for determining and granting them, alongside other standard provisions for laws that govern social protection and the budgetary system.

One immediately noticeable provision is Article 3, which defines when an individual is considered to be residing in KiM:

„An individual is considered to be residing in the region of special social protection if they have permanently settled in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija, where they own or lease a residence where they live with family, maintain other properties they use, spend their free time, and participate in the social, cultural, and religious life. Essentially, their center of life activities, professional, economic, family, social, and other connections are proven to be permanently tied to the place where they reside in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.“

It appears that a Commission for the Assessment of Special Social Status, as specified in Article 14, will oversee compliance with this requirement. This commission, seemingly to be formed in each municipality, would include representatives from the local social welfare center, the relevant branch of the National Employment Service, and the municipality itself.

In this regard, it’s worth noting that the scope of eligible individuals is broader than initially announced—“only those who truly live in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.“ This broader scope, which could include internally displaced persons or those who have moved from KiM in the past two years, is not necessarily negative.

However, considering that Serbian authorities have been effectively removed from KiM over the past two years, managing these commissions will likely be challenging and may even require relocating them.

In addition to the above conditions, Articles 8 and 9 require individuals to recognize the Republic of Serbia as their state—a stipulation reminiscent of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

At that time, individuals demonstrated compliance by signing relevant documents, and the refusal of Kosovo Albanians to sign them served as a formal justification for their mass exodus from institutions.

Since then, many Albanians have received pensions and other financial benefits from the Republic of Serbia after 1999. It is uncertain whether this requirement will actually impede the continuation of these benefits.

I believe it is positive that the range of benefits remains open to expansion through special government programs, though it is unfortunate that they remain categorized as social welfare. Financial support is also needed by those not currently facing social vulnerability, such as business owners affected by import blockades or those who incur extra costs when withdrawing dinar-based payments from ATMs or in Raška.

In this regard, Article 13 stipulates:

„A request under Paragraph 1 of this Article is submitted electronically or at a filing office designated by the Government for the receipt of requests for the exercise of public and administrative services in the region of special social protection.“

However, given that these filing offices have mostly been relocated to administrative border crossings—a measure that aligns with the plan’s third point—this provision is rather awkwardly phrased.

The Second Proposal

The second draft law establishes a framework for prosecuting a range of criminal offenses through a specialized department of the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office and a special division of the Higher Court in Belgrade, detailing key matters for these bodies’ operation.

This proposal is particularly notable for its broad definition of criminal offenses as:

“All criminal offenses prescribed by the Criminal Code that were committed after February 17, 2008, in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija,’ which represents a significant expansion beyond the ‘plan’ and the proposal’s explanation, where the term ‘interim self-government authorities’ is used exclusively.”

Under this broad provision, the new authorities could prosecute both Serbs and Albanians for any criminal offense—even, in an extensive interpretation, for conducting Kosovo elections, establishing and operating Kosovo institutions, or applying Kosovo’s laws, as these actions could be construed as criminal under Serbian law, given the constitutional status of KiM.

Interestingly, Article 10 stipulates that:

“Criminal proceedings for offenses outlined in Article 2 of this law initiated before the law’s entry into force will be concluded according to the provisions of this law.”

There aren’t many such cases, as far as I know, but some are quite prominent, making it interesting to see how this provision will be implemented.

This can also be said for the entire law—it is so broad that its effectiveness depends solely on those who will enforce it. This also raises challenges related to evidence collection in KiM, where few Serbian authorities remain, and in the enforcement of verdicts that will likely affect primarily Serbs under the jurisdiction of Serbian authorities.

Meanwhile, it is improbable, for instance, that an international warrant would be issued for Albin Kurti for executing a judgment against him under this law.

Instead of a conclusion

I believe these proposals continue the Serbian government’s façade policy, which hides full cooperation behind a veneer of legality. For such cooperation, the EU has rewarded Serbian authorities with a reform agenda that neither mentions nor is conditioned on anything related to Kosovo.

Conversely, the approved reform agenda for the Pristina authorities issues only mild warnings on topics like language use or community participation mechanisms (without extending to municipal elections).

This indicates that both Belgrade’s and Pristina’s current policies will continue (especially in the absence of firm sanctions), which is becoming increasingly extreme. Meanwhile, arbitrary arrests, beatings, harassment, and intimidation of Serbs in northern Kosovo continue almost daily, with only lukewarm responses from official Belgrade.

In this bleak reality, these legislative proposals will change little on the ground and only further expose the contradictions in Serbia’s Kosovo policy, which seeks to dismantle its own constitutional framework.

These laws cannot prevent this situation from evolving. Consequently, the incremental recognition of certain elements of Kosovo’s sovereignty cannot be halted through them but only by ending the Brussels process and, more broadly, the EU accession process with which it is inseparably linked.

This would require a fundamental shift in Belgrade’s official policy, yet no willingness for such a change exists. Although EU membership prospects are uncertain, this limbo status—based on various reform agendas—suits all parties, with the price, as always, borne by Serbs in Kosovo.