
Four months after parliamentary elections, Kosovo remains mired in a deep institutional crisis, with no functioning parliament or government. At the same time, Kosovo Serbs—especially in the north—have seen their political agency steadily eroded, said Tatjana Lazarević, editor-in-chief of the independent Mitrovica-based portal KoSSev, in an interview with Montenegrin weekly Monitor.
Lazarević described the current post-election deadlock not just as a political impasse but as a constitutional vacuum. Despite the February elections, the Kosovo Assembly has not yet convened, and no party commands a majority to form a government. The main dispute now centers around the nomination of a parliamentary speaker—Vetëvendosje insists on its candidate Albulena Haxhiu, while the opposition refuses to back her, blocking the formation of any new leadership structure.
She pointed to a precedent from 2014, when Kosovo faced a similar stalemate after elections. At that time, it took nearly six months and required the intervention of the Constitutional Court, strong international pressure, and a compromise between the two largest parties (PDK and LDK) to finally establish a government.
“Unlike in 2014, this time no request has been submitted to the Constitutional Court to interpret what happens if the election winner fails to secure a parliamentary speaker,” Lazarević explained. “This leaves Kosovo suspended in legal ambiguity, without a clear mechanism for moving forward.”
She outlined several possible exit strategies: a political compromise between the major parties; a formal appeal to the Constitutional Court to clarify procedural gaps; or renewed pressure from the international community. However, she stressed that international engagement today is notably weaker than during the 2014 crisis.
„Unless, of course, a resolution comes through clandestine bargaining—just enough to secure four ‘mystery’ votes.“
Although President Vjosa Osmani has shown interest in facilitating a solution, her hands are tied—new elections cannot be called unless all options to form a government under the current composition are exhausted. Until then, the gridlock is likely to continue.
Erosion of Northern Serb Autonomy
Turning to the situation of Kosovo Serbs, Lazarević said the community has been steadily stripped of its political autonomy and institutional presence—particularly in the north—through a combination of actions by both Pristina and Belgrade.
Over the past decade, she argued, the Serbian government—via the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)—has undermined the independent political agency once held by Kosovo Serbs. “What was once a de facto local autonomy rooted in institutional structures and territorial control has been systematically dismantled,” she said.
“Today, Belgrade controls the community remotely—switching them on and off like a remote control, adjusting tone and image like a television channel broadcasting mostly propaganda and primitivism,” she added.
Following recent local elections in Serb-majority municipalities, Pristina has moved quickly to reclaim control of public buildings once used by Serbian institutions. In just two weeks during May and June, Kosovo authorities took over nine such facilities (with 12 services), including municipal services, cultural centers, and employment offices.
Kosovo Police have also begun warning residents that Serbian-issued identity cards for addresses in Kosovo may soon be considered invalid—despite previous verbal agreements brokered under EU facilitation that allowed mutual recognition of ID cards.
Apathy from Belgrade, Silence from the West
Lazarević criticized Belgrade’s largely passive or symbolic responses to these developments, suggesting that while the Serbian government is focused on fulfilling its formal obligations under international agreements, it simultaneously manipulates the Serbian community in Kosovo and conceals the reality from them, rather than genuinely defending their rights and interests.
Meanwhile, international actors, she said, mostly issue weak statements to preserve appearances. “Western diplomats in Pristina don’t object to the closure of Serbian institutions—they only occasionally object to the timing or manner,” she noted. “Their vague statements are just enough to reassure their own capitals that human rights haven’t been completely ignored.”
She warned that the municipal assemblies in the north, now largely one-ethnic and dominated by Vetëvendosje loyalists, are pushing through policies that disregard the will of the majority Serbian population and engage in “ethnic engineering.”
“The very institution of local self-government is being ridiculed,” she said.
European Mechanisms Out of Reach
As Kosovo pursues membership in the Council of Europe and other international institutions, Lazarević questioned whether Kosovo Serbs will have access to mechanisms like the European Court of Human Rights, even if Kosovo formally joins.
“Justice is increasingly out of reach—because of the collapse of local Serbian structures, administrative blockades, and selective application of the law,” she stated. “It’s unclear whether individuals have the resources or capacity to pursue justice through European channels.”
Skepticism Toward Rule of Law and Geopolitical Narratives
Asked whether the upcoming trials in absentia of 53 Serbian military and police officials—charged with war crimes—will deliver justice, Lazarević’s answer was unequivocal: “No.”
She also expressed skepticism about international narratives equating Kosovo with Crimea, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to abandon this comparison, which Moscow uses to justify its aggression in Ukraine and to challenge the legitimacy of Western interventions.
She emphasized that Russia’s persistent use of the Kosovo-Crimea parallel reflects a larger geopolitical struggle, where legal and political arguments are selectively applied to suit the interests of major powers. Despite this, the majority of Western legal experts and states maintain that the cases are fundamentally different, reaffirming Kosovo’s status as a unique case of self-determination, distinct from Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
“Although Kosovo has somewhat faded from the global agenda, its symbolic value remains potent in great power politics,” she said.
A Community That Endures in Silence
Reflecting on the political mood among Kosovo Serbs, Lazarević said many quietly wish for change in Serbia but are conditioned to endure. “Only among Kosovo Serbs is endurance an active verb,” she remarked.
“They hope that one day things will improve, but in the short term they comfort themselves with the thought: ‘Be quiet—it could be worse.’”
Still, she sees a glimmer of hope in the youngest generation. “Among the very youngest, I see a different kind of culture—integrity, freedom of thought, and dignity. They carry Kosovo as part of their Serbian identity, but where they will end up when they grow up is another question.”
Preuzimanje i objavljivanje tekstova sa portala KoSSev nije dozvoljeno bez navođenja izvora. Hvala na poštovanju etike novinarske profesije.








