By Dragutin Nenezić
Last week, an article published by Politico stirred debate across Serbia and Kosovo. The piece suggested three things: that the United States is lobbying to scale down NATO’s mission in Kosovo; that a “drawdown” from Kosovo is under consideration; and that Washington has signalled a desire to wind down the NATO-led Kosovo Force, KFOR.
Terminological inconsistencies aside, the message was clear enough: if the report is accurate, the United States is contemplating changes to KFOR’s role. A denial followed, carefully worded to address the current deployment rather than future intentions. The public was also reminded that similar announcements have surfaced before.
Still, such signals inevitably trigger a certain enthusiasm among parts of the Serbian public. At a time when the last tangible traces of Serbia’s institutional presence in Kosovo are fading, this reaction is both understandable — and unfounded. More importantly, the issue forms part of a broader and troubling trend that deserves deeper analysis, particularly regarding its implications for Kosovo Serbs.
The Legal Framework
The international military presence in Kosovo rests on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution authorises the establishment of an international security presence, outlines its responsibilities — preventing renewed hostilities, overseeing the withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian forces, demilitarising the KLA, ensuring a safe environment for refugees, maintaining public order until civilian authorities take over, securing borders and guaranteeing freedom of movement — and foresees substantial NATO participation under unified command. This framework was operationalised through the Military-Technical Agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO.
From a strictly legal standpoint, several conclusions follow:
Adjusting the number of KFOR troops — upward or downward — does not require a new UN Security Council resolution. This falls within NATO’s authority.
A U.S. withdrawal from KFOR would likewise be an internal NATO matter.
A full termination of KFOR could potentially occur without a new resolution if the UN
Security Council determined that the mission’s mandate had been fulfilled — for example, in the event of a comprehensive settlement between Belgrade and Pristina.
Given the geopolitical realities within the Security Council and the veto powers of its permanent members, any development requiring a new resolution appears unlikely. In practice, Resolution 1244 has already been overtaken by events in many respects, with few tangible consequences. Its remaining significance for Serbia lies primarily in its affirmation of territorial integrity — an integrity Serbia increasingly appears reluctant to defend directly, instead entrusting it to European mediation frameworks, including the 2023 agreement with Pristina.
Possible Scenarios
Two broad scenarios emerge: a U.S. withdrawal and/or troop reduction within KFOR, or the complete dissolution of the mission.
Scenario One: U.S. Exit, NATO Rebalancing
Should the United States reduce its presence, the most probable replacement would be Turkey — already one of the largest contributors to KFOR. Turkey has expanded its influence in the Balkans, and Serbia’s posture toward Ankara has recently softened. The two countries participate together — alongside Kosovo — in regional diplomatic initiatives. There have even been reports of a potential Turkish base near Rogozna, a strategically sensitive area near Novi Pazar, where President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to visit. Under this scenario, KFOR would remain, but with a recalibrated internal balance.
Scenario Two: KFOR Replaced
In a more radical scenario, KFOR could be replaced by alternative military frameworks in which Kosovo already participates. Most notable among them is the emerging trilateral defence cooperation between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia — a structure enjoying NATO’s tacit approval. The declaration underpinning this alliance leaves room for deeper operational engagement on Kosovo’s territory. Initial expressions of Serbian concern were swiftly toned down.
Beyond this, Kosovo has signed additional military agreements, including one with Turkey. In parallel, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) continues to strengthen — arguably in tension with the spirit, if not the letter, of Resolution 1244 — with support from allies and coordination with KFOR itself. The KSF has even contributed personnel to international stabilisation efforts in Gaza, a mission operating under a UN Security Council mandate, despite Kosovo not being a UN member. The gesture was publicly acknowledged by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In the absence of KFOR, the only real constraints on further KSF expansion would be demographic and financial — not political.
The Broader Strategic Picture
Last week also brought a symbolic moment: former U.S. President Donald Trump thanked both Kosovo and Serbia for their role in stabilisation efforts — though Serbia was not physically present. Symbolism often reveals more than formal statements. Kosovo has steadily integrated itself into international security structures: the Peace Committee, stabilisation missions, bilateral and trilateral military alliances. Serbia has not.
If KFOR remains, internal force redistribution will likely occur, and continuity will prevail. If it departs, Kosovo has already laid the groundwork for alternatives. In nearly every cited security framework, Serbia — and particularly Serbs in northern Kosovo — are implicitly framed as the primary security concern.
The trajectory of Kosovo’s military development suggests that any strengthening of its security forces will be directed accordingly, with international backing. Serbia’s own military modernisation, in this context, serves primarily as deterrence. An outright attack on Kosovo does not align with Washington’s vision for the Balkans — a vision Serbia continues to follow without open confrontation.
What remains striking, however, is not what Serbia cannot do in the face of the United States, Turkey or Croatia. It is what it chooses not to do when Kosovo Serbs face the erosion of their university, healthcare and education systems — the last institutional ties binding them to the Serbian state. And that, more than troop numbers or NATO communiqués, may prove the most consequential development of all.
All views expressed in this text are the author’s personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial board. KoSSev is not the author of this text.
Preuzimanje i objavljivanje tekstova sa portala KoSSev nije dozvoljeno bez navođenja izvora. Hvala na poštovanju etike novinarske profesije.
