By Dragutin Nenezić
While over the past two weeks, ahead of each installment of this series, the focus was on international topics, this week—before this final installment—the spotlight was on a completely local issue: the elections and Kurti’s decisive victory. It is somehow symbolic that this comes immediately before a text on North Mitrovica, given the city’s symbolic importance for Kurti’s win.
Namely, everything that has taken place in North Mitrovica over the past three years—laid out in great detail in this text—contributed to Kurti’s victory, at least to the same percentage he secured both last spring and now. And there is everything here: measures that also occurred in other northern municipalities (such as entry into the AKO, the takeover of buildings belonging to Serbian institutions, and the mass employment of Albanians), as well as highly symbolic steps of a smaller scale (such as designing a coat of arms, removing graffiti, and renaming streets) or of greater magnitude (such as building new bridges, frequent land-use changes, and laying foundation stones), all the way to the ultimate step of an undeclared unification of the two Mitrovicas (through the establishment of a joint board, various memoranda, and the restoration of public transport).
All of this, of course, has been followed by KoSSev with far more attention than by Serbian Kosovo politics. And all of it, by all appearances, will remain as it is, since the returnees seem to have no intention of reversing anything except entry into the AKO, while Kurti’s ministry has no intention of reversing even that—and why would it, when it is clear that during this term it will finally render the already pointless Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) entirely meaningless?
I believe it is still too early to assess what lies behind this passivization—whether it is a continuation of the trend of passivization in Belgrade’s Kosovo policy, some kind of political non-aggression agreement (and non-dismissal, or new hiring, in both systems), a reflection of electricity trading (which only one side firmly denies), or a bit of everything—but it is certainly a harbinger of what awaits Serbs in northern Kosovo in the years ahead.
This is the new Kurti government which, despite all unrealistic expectations and (self-)deceptions, will treat the North as part of Kosovo. After the initial phase of consolidating power through lesser or greater force, it will do so under the façade of the “rule of law.” While the Serbian university, education system, and healthcare are under siege, work will continue around them within Kosovo institutions; Kosovo taxes will be paid and fines imposed by Kosovo inspections settled in euros; premises will be privatized and tenants evicted; and new buildings will be constructed—buildings that may not be massively inhabited by new residents, but which certainly will not be sold either, as there is already widespread talk of an informal (political) ban on sales.
The old North Mitrovica, a symbol of Serbian resistance, has been almost symbolically liquidated—apart from the aforementioned trio, only the monuments remain for that liquidation to be complete. The bridges are open, and the promenade has been taken over. There are no longer any celebrations of the SL’s electoral victories, for reasons still unknown—possibly also because Serbian flags have been thoroughly expelled from public spaces (unlike Albanian and Great Albanian ones), with the occasional exception that proves the rule.
Such a situation undoubtedly demoralizes the already deeply demoralized Serbs in the North, because even the little hope that was offered to them by the spoonful, in conditional terms (when Trump comes, when they return to the municipalities, when Kurti falls, etc.), has proved either unjustified or has not materialized at all. What, at the end of such a year, can even be said to people in that state? When I received the invitation to write about this, I began in a textbook manner—what has been adopted and what can concretely be reconsidered—only to realize today that instead I can write just one thing, which I have been repeating in various forms to friends from North Mitrovica over the past two days. No matter how bad the situation is, what makes a person human is the struggle; and for that struggle to have meaning, expectations must be realistic.
Instead of placing hope in others (in Belgrade, Washington, or elsewhere), accept that your boundaries have already been set—both real and political. What has been agreed will be implemented, by persuasion or by force, but it still leaves some room for a certain kind of struggle—it is up to you how you will use it.
All statements presented in this text are the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors. KoSSev is not the author of the text.
Read more:
Return to the Institutions: Zvecan and Leposavic
Return to the Institutions: Zubin Potok
Preuzimanje i objavljivanje tekstova sa portala KoSSev nije dozvoljeno bez navođenja izvora. Hvala na poštovanju etike novinarske profesije.
