
By: Saša Janković
Dear Iljir,
Like you, I see the agreement between the U.S. administration and Milorad Dodik in Bosnia and Herzegovina – specifically in the Republika Srpska – as multilayered, but also as a kind of pilot program of U.S. policy for the Balkans.
The future of Bosnia and Herzegovina
I would say that today’s America no longer sees the old goal for Bosnia, as envisioned by Dayton – a civic state as a new form of “brotherhood and unity,” a reformed, democratized, and capitalist mini-Yugoslavia – as an easily or immediately attainable project. Three decades after the end of the conflict, BiH has not become a stable or fully functional state. On the contrary, the trends seem negative. Political actors have fallen into an endless loop of mutual accusations, self-praise, and blame of others for the lack of progress, far removed from the real needs of citizens.
The institution of the High Representative – an official appointed by a group of foreign countries, now without confirmation from the UN Security Council, and who has in practice acquired the power to enact laws bypassing the Parliament of BiH – may have been a necessary temporary anachronism immediately after the war. But if, thirty years later, a country we consider sovereign still has a foreign governor who uses his vast powers increasingly, something is fundamentally wrong.
Although I am not close to Dodik or his politics (let me remind you that I once publicly called on him to resign, while he called me a “great thug”), I cannot disagree with the presumed U.S. assessment that it is illusory to continue as before and expect a different outcome.
What happens next depends primarily on Dodik and his political current, and then on the EU, the Serbian government, and other Bosnian and regional actors. If Dodik wants the best for himself and for Republika Srpska, he will have to change on two fronts.
The first is foreign policy, which you also mentioned – turning toward NATO and the Western civilization, with emphasis on the United States. I believe he is capable of taking that step.
The second is internal, and here I am much less confident: a political transformation toward BiH and within Republika Srpska itself. In relation to BiH, Dodik’s political current should enable a detoxification of relations among political representatives of the “constituent peoples.” This means not using others’ mistakes and bad intentions as an excuse to undermine BiH or threaten secession, but rather – if he is wise – to adopt a constructive and protective attitude toward the state as a whole, thereby establishing a dominant political profile not only in RS but throughout BiH.
Within Republika Srpska, it is essential to enable de-partization and de-corruptionalization (if such a term exists, but you know what I mean) of the entity’s governance apparatus.
When I write all this and then think of Dodik, I myself wonder what reality I live in. But you asked me what I think is happening and whether it will succeed. My answer to the latter is: I don’t know – I hope it will, but I wouldn’t necessarily bet on it. However, to the question of whether one can continue as before and expect a positive outcome, my answer is clear: no. That would be unintelligent – perhaps even malicious – a small-minded, self-serving refusal to face the truth.
Judging by statements from top officials of the regime in Belgrade, if Dodik and RS do embark on a new, better course, they will not have their support. I regret that, though it doesn’t surprise me, and I hope it will soon be irrelevant.
The future of Serbia
The situation in Serbia, I would say, seems less uncertain in terms of the general direction, but only in broad strokes. The large commemorative gathering in Novi Sad, organized by the student movement, confirmed that the state of the country is unsustainable and that political change has become not a matter of political choice, but of social inevitability. I have written to you about this before, but I now repeat it with even greater conviction – Serbia cannot be put to rest.
We do not yet know when and how a new political reality will come, since Aleksandar Vučić’s regime has returned the country to a pre-political and institutionless state – but it will come. I am convinced of that, and I am doing what little I can to ensure it happens peacefully. Despite repression, provocations, and the authorities’ readiness to use every means of force, I believe Serbia knows better than to seek freedom through violence.
The upcoming student electoral list, regardless of the names it includes, will receive overwhelming support. Even though its composition will probably not immediately provide a clear answer regarding Serbia’s political direction after Vučić, that support – through its scale and the moral credibility stemming from the youth behind it – will make regime change possible.
There is no lack of intelligence. If there is also a bit of help and luck, after the change we will begin to rebuild our political and institutional system from the ashes, restoring justice and trust. I believe we can do that. Within two electoral cycles, the political profile of the new Serbia will likely become clear. I am certain we will have no reason to miss the current government.
And if something similar, in the meantime, happens in Kosovo and Metohija, we might together begin to build a better living space for all our people and nations.
Sincerely,
Saša
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