Kosovo à la Trump (Part 2): On Peace and Other Agreements

By Dragutin Nenezić

The past week on the international stage was marked by peace agreements, in contrast to the domestic scene, which was marked by escalating conflict and violence. Although at first glance there seems to be no direct connection, I believe that one of the key causes of what we see happening on the streets of Serbia lies in what has taken place in Kosovo over the past 12 years — and what may eventually become the subject of a new agreement. This series is dedicated to that question. As always, let’s take it step by step.

Azerbaijan and Armenia

Last Monday, the draft of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia was released, having been initialed the week before at the White House, which I covered in the previous installment. It is a classic peace agreement, which apparently leaves no room for territorial exchange (Art. 2), but only for demarcation (Art. 7). It contains no provisions on the return of displaced persons, minority rights, or the status of cultural heritage. Particularly notable is the clause stipulating that failure to comply with the agreement cannot be justified by invoking national legislation (Art. 12).

With that in mind, this agreement can hardly serve as a model for Kosovo, as some have suggested in our public debate. The circumstances are entirely different, both historically and militarily: Azerbaijan won the war and consolidated its territory, and it is now up to Armenia to recognize that in one way or another. The initialing of this agreement is one step in that direction. Serbia, by contrast, did not wage war against Kosovo or Albania, but against NATO, and the outcome was the Kumanovo Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Everything that followed — including the declaration of independence and the Brussels process — has gone in a different direction. At best, the Armenian example may serve as a reminder of how not to treat one’s own people and church (which are still present in Kosovo), as well as one’s constitution and international allies (including an understanding of who those allies truly are).

Russia, the U.S., and Ukraine

At the end of the week, on Friday, Putin and Trump met — an event so widely covered in the media that there’s no need to go into detail here. No agreement was reached, but negotiations are underway, and the emphasis is that this too should be a peace agreement. Again, the circumstances are different from both Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo, leaving little room for deeper comparisons, as I have already written.

Still, a few points may be relevant for a potential Kosovo agreement:

• The U.S. first secured its own economic interests through a separate agreement (despite all the caveats, such as the actual mining potential of Ukraine — where we see another similarity with Kosovo in the mythologization of mineral wealth);

• The (lack of) outcome of negotiations will largely depend on the military support the political West continues to provide Ukraine; and

• Any eventual agreement will be concluded between Russia and Ukraine, with U.S. mediation.

On another level, the Kosovo agreement may even hinge on the Ukrainian one: if no deal is reached in Ukraine, and Trump still wants his Nobel Prize, he may push for a Kosovo settlement, where success would be easier to achieve given the greater willingness of the parties to cooperate.

The Prospect of a Kosovo Agreement

In this sense, the choice is binary — a Kosovo agreement may or may not be concluded.
If it is, it will likely rest on the following:

• Absolute equality of the parties, i.e., Serbia and Kosovo, without territorial exchange, partition of Kosovo, or similar solutions. None of the examples discussed here or in the previous installment point to any other possibility, especially given the current security situation in Serbia;

• U.S. economic interests, which, in my view — as I wrote earlier — are more likely to lie in mining than in water resources (as in the cases of Egypt and Ethiopia, or India and Pakistan). This is particularly evident since Kurti took control of Gazivode without any reaction from the Serbian side; and

• The security architecture Kosovo has built with the help of its allies, including the military alliance of Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo (resembling the Romania–Moldova–Ukraine bloc), the unified military policy of Albania and Kosovo, and the steady U.S. support for arming the Kosovo Security Force. For the purposes of this text, we can disregard Turkey’s attempt to create a regional forum, even though the word “peace” in its name sounds ominous.

In other words, such an agreement could not possibly be favorable either for Serbs in Kosovo or for Serbia as a state.

If, however, no agreement is reached, it will mean — at least for the time being — that the U.S. is satisfied with the current situation in Kosovo (and that Trump’s talk of peace between Serbia and Kosovo is in fact a message directed at Serbia) — which will be the focus of the next part.

All statements presented in this text are the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors. KoSSev is not the author of the text.

All statements presented in this text are the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors. KoSSev is not the author of the text.

Kosovo à la Trump, and Other Misconceptions of Serbian Politics (Part 1)