By Dragutin Nenezić
“And Miki always has the exact time and is always right! You know, in his street, nobody dares to move their clock forward or back when it’s time to change the clocks—until he does it first.”
Dule Pacov, “Vratiće se rode”
Trump’s mention of preventing conflict in Kosovo (there are already too many references to link here—see KoSSev for details) has become a commonplace in Serbia’s current political climate, used by everyone to serve their own purposes and ease their frustrations. In a general crisis of legitimacy at all levels and in all jurisdictions—amid a political crisis in Serbia now entering its tenth month and a constitutional crisis in Pristina entering its fifth—the intensity of Trump’s political style across all fields can easily mislead even those who consider themselves well-versed.
Since I have many friends on both sides of the growing divide in Serbian society, in this and the following few articles, I would like to point out certain elements of Trump’s peace-brokering show—specifically those written into agreements and other documents—so that we can, as rationally as possible, assess the prospects for any hoped-for improvements for Kosovo-Metohija Serbs.
From the outset, I will exclude the Abraham Accords, as they are a product of Trump’s first term. Then Cambodia and Thailand, since that is merely a ceasefire. The same applies to Israel and Iran, as well as India and Pakistan—ceasefires again, with no official documents publicly available.
With Egypt and Ethiopia, the situation is slightly different. The dispute over the construction of a dam on the upper Nile in Ethiopia never escalated into armed conflict. The dam was built and is expected to be operational this autumn. Trump recently mentioned that he was working to resolve this dispute, which, of course, was welcomed by Egypt’s president—but there is still no resolution.
This leaves us with only Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Rwanda and the DR Congo, to examine.
Chronologically, let’s start with Rwanda and the DR Congo. In short, since 2022, Rwandan armed forces, supporting rebel groups in the DR Congo, have taken over territory significant not only in size (estimates vary) but also in natural resources, especially minerals. Then, in June of this year, a peace agreement was signed at the White House. In brief, the agreement reaffirms the territorial integrity of both signatories, sets obligations regarding disarmament and refugees/internally displaced persons, and, of course, outlines opportunities for economic cooperation—in partnership with, among others, the U.S. government and investors, “as the case may be.” Shortly thereafter, in July, an American company signed an agreement with the DR Congo on the potential exploitation of lithium—though with the small complication that the site is under arbitration, prompting objections from an Australian company, the previous owner.
Then, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The history of the conflict is largely known, so I won’t repeat it here—especially since I visited Nagorno-Karabakh earlier this year and have wanted to write about the similarities and differences with both Kosovo and the Republic of Serbian Krajina. What matters for this piece is that, after the conflict, the status of the Zangezur Corridor remained disputed. The corridor lies within Armenia’s territory and connects Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. Just a few days ago, a peace agreement and a joint statement were initialed at the White House.
It should be stressed that the road to a final, signed agreement depends on many things, including possible amendments to Armenia’s constitution renouncing claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. The structure of the statement makes the pattern clear: the parties express mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction, while Armenia will work with the U.S. on developing the Zangezur Corridor—here rebranded as the “TRIPP” (“Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”). Naturally, this was followed by support for Trump’s nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize.
What comes next, alongside the publication of the draft peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, is a meeting between Putin and Trump, which could yield a whole range of outcomes—from determining Ukraine’s fate, to a new Yalta, and back to continued war. Until then, I will focus only on these two examples, before moving on.
So, two common elements of Trump’s peace-brokering efforts—whether genuine achievements or merely a pretext for his Nobel nomination—are: 1) Respect for territorial integrity; and 2) An economic dimension tied to U.S. investments.
This was also present in the so-called Washington Agreement, so Trump has no need to push for a new document for Belgrade and Pristina to sign—he already “stopped” the 2018 Kosovo partition plan in some way with that “agreement.”
If a new document is signed, in whatever form and with the clear aim of boosting Trump’s Nobel prospects, it will start from the premise that two equal parties are concluding it, each respecting the other’s territorial integrity. These two examples contain no elements of territorial exchange—despite Rwanda’s military presence in DR Congo—though Armenia’s prime minister does not rule out such a possibility in the final agreement.
The economic dimension could be tied to roads (e.g., extending the Morava Corridor, already being built by an American company) or mineral wealth (given the ongoing geological exploration of Rogozna on the Novi Pazar side, conducted by an Australian company with partial Chinese financial backing), especially considering that “Lake Trump” has become a stage for Prime Minister Kurti’s police, political, and other showmanship.
All statements presented in this text are the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editors. KoSSev is not the author of the text.
Preuzimanje i objavljivanje tekstova sa portala KoSSev nije dozvoljeno bez navođenja izvora. Hvala na poštovanju etike novinarske profesije.
