By Dragutin Nenezić
Over the past week, which has passed since the first installment of this series, the international community has made sure things did not become dull. Here, however, I would like to draw attention only to the partial lifting of the EU’s already weak measures, justified by the “orderly and peaceful transfer of power.” In other words, something that should be normal is being rewarded— which, in a way, only confirms how abnormal the takeover/usurpation of power in the municipalities of northern Kosovo in 2023 actually was.
On the other hand, at the local level, assembly sessions were held in all four municipalities of northern Kosovo, where abandoning the Association of Kosovo Municipalities was highlighted as a priority. Unfortunately, this confirms that the focus of those returning to the institutions will be the Association/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) as the backbone of Belgrade’s Kosovo policy.
It is hard to say what is more pointless: the insistence of the institutional usurpers on the Association of Kosovo Municipalities as a substitute for the ASM; the annulment of that insistence by the returnees as a priority despite all the inherited problems; or the fact that all the sacrifices I mentioned in the previous installment are slowly being steered toward the ASM as their ultimate goal.
It is also telling that, in its reaction, the Kosovo ministry does not mention the law I repeatedly cite, but refers only to the Law on Local Self-Government. It remains to be seen whether this is a matter of tactics or ignorance, and whether the ministry will take any action in this regard or tolerate the returnees as long as they operate within what is deemed acceptable.
In that sense, dealing with the return to the institutions is a thankless task, because it is possible that nothing new will actually happen— that the returnees will not annul anything, nor will the ministry annul that annulment— all so that the EU can fully lift its measures and the long journey toward the ASM can be somewhat shortened, in line with US and EU instructions that have taken increasingly clear shape in recent weeks through various laws, declarations, and conclusions.
Still, let me try.
Zvecan and Leposavic share several characteristics in this regard, which I will briefly address.
First, these are municipalities where employment during the usurpation was the most intensive, though not mono-ethnic, since—perhaps surprisingly to some—Serbs were also employed in Zvecan.
Judging by the first weeks of the returnee authorities, there will be no dismissals apart from the level of officials, and according to as-yet unconfirmed rumors, some Serbs employed during the usurpation may even be promoted.
This may irritate many, who can justifiably ask for whose benefit they left the institutions (and some even left Kosovo never to return, were killed, or ended up in prison). Still, this is hardly surprising and is something people will have to get used to.
Second, these are municipalities with pronounced housing problems.
Fortunately, the eviction of families in Lesak due to alleged illegal construction— which was magically halted by some political deal between Minister Rašić and the usurper Hetemi— did not have its counterpart in Zvecan.
Both municipalities, however, appear to be included in one of several housing programs that Pristina is implementing in northern Kosovo.
How the change of authority will affect this—namely, whether evictions in Lesak will continue in parallel with construction programs—remains to be seen.
What is certainly clear, however, is that Pristina’s policy is aimed at altering the ethnic structure of northern Kosovo to the detriment of Serbs, and that the returnee authorities would have to respond to this with all available means if they truly intend to safeguard Serbian interests.
Of course, both municipalities face the same set of property and legal issues as other municipalities: from the takeover of social housing in Leposavic (as well as the sports hall), to the activities of the Kosovo Privatization Agency (for example, regarding NIS fuel stations or the premises of Srbijаšume in Leposavic).
While a return to power in the former case could lead to a relatively painless resolution (since these are facilities taken over by the municipality itself), in the case of privatization there is still no sign of a more active role by municipalities in the North, despite legal provisions that allow for such involvement.
And when it comes to these two municipalities, this is merely an introduction to a time bomb—the status of Trepča’s assets.
Namely, after the de facto nationalization of Trepča some ten years ago, the issue of its assets in northern Kosovo has been raised individually and sporadically.
I am aware of one recent case that is not public, so I will not write about it here, as well as of occasional reports in Kosovo media.
If this issue were to be fully opened, these two municipalities would likely be the most endangered, given their historical and organic ties to Trepča.
Without delving here into the details of Trepča’s ownership in these two municipalities, I believe that one of the priorities of the new authorities should be precisely the resolution of this issue, in order to halt—at least in this segment—these trends that are harmful to the Serbian population.
Or perhaps that time bomb will never explode, in line with another observable trend.
All views expressed in this text are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial staff.
KoSSev is not the author of the text.
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