The Serbian government recently passed a law designating Kosovo as a region of special social care, allowing for new employment opportunities, financial support for various demographics, and investment in infrastructure like „modern offices“ near border crossings. This legislative move, expected since President Aleksandar Vučić’s announcement two months ago amid escalating crises in Kosovo, represents a significant financial commitment from Serbia—reportedly over €120 million annually—towards support for Kosovo Serbs. According to legal expert Ivan Ninić, this development raises constitutional concerns, as it involves spending substantial state funds on a territory constitutionally defined as indivisible under Serbian law.
In a statement for KoSSev, Ninić criticizes this policy as the final phase of implementing the Brussels Agreement, accusing Vučić of devising a „legal basis“ to channel budgetary resources to Kosovo while technically separating it from Serbia’s governance.
He argues that dissenters may be labeled as “state enemies,” with any questions about the necessity of special laws for Kosovo met only with claims that Vučić is looking out for the people.
Additionally, the government introduced a law expanding the jurisdiction of Serbian judicial bodies to prosecute crimes committed in Kosovo. Ninić denounces this as unconstitutional, suggesting it is tailored to handle cases like that of controversial figure Milan Radoičić.
„This is a lex specialis (special law) tailored for the case of Milan Radoičić. What Aleksandar Vučić is artificially trying to do by relocating the judiciary from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija to Belgrade is spinning and an attempt to extract something from the great powers, while also stating – well, here we go, now we will, formally, be responsible for both Milan Radoičić and Banjska,“ said Ninić.
He further alleged that the law was also introduced to maintain Serbia’s claim over legal matters in Kosovo, even though it contradicts previous agreements made under the Brussels framework.
He points out the practical challenges, such as a lack of Serbian police presence in Kosovo and no legal agreement between Belgrade and Pristina on judicial cooperation.
Ninić further alleges that these new laws symbolize a shift towards recognizing Kosovo’s de facto state attributes, despite Serbia’s official stance. He reflects on the 2013 and 2015 Brussels Agreements, which integrated Serbian judiciary members into the Kosovo judicial system, a decision endorsed by Vučić.
Ninić recalls how 40 Serbian judges and 13 prosecutors took an oath in 2017 before Kosovo’s then-President Hashim Thaçi, with Vučić’s approval, suggesting that these current legislative efforts are contradictory to earlier concessions made by Serbia.
In conclusion, Ninić warns that these laws may represent a political maneuver under the guise of social support while subtly undermining Serbia’s constitutional integrity, risking heightened regional tensions and legal ambiguity regarding Kosovo’s status within Serbian governance.
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