New Voices of an Old Ideology?

By: Ilir Deda

Dear Saša,

Thank you for your response. I understand the argument that politics does not function solely through rational messages and nuances. I also understand that societies long exposed to propaganda, fear, and the systematic erosion of institutions often hear symbols more easily than complex and realistic political ideas.

But this is precisely where my question begins, because I have often spoken in Serbia about the recognition of Kosovo, which I see as the culmination of a long process — a moment when conflict ceases to be the primary framework of relations and opens space for what should exist between neighbors: normality, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations. Not because one signature resolves history, nor because it solves everything, but because no conflict can remain politically frozen forever without its consequences continuing to live on among people.

Kosovo itself is precisely where a much broader question becomes visible: can politics truly escape inherited patterns or does it merely reproduce them differently?

Our societies inherit not only unresolved disputes; they also inherit political reflexes and ways of understanding “patriotism,” imagining identity, speaking about compromise, and drawing lines between “us” and “them.” And they inherit fears which often survive the longest.

That is why change rarely begins with a change of government. Governments change much more easily than political culture. That is precisely why, for decades now, we have been hearing similar political hopes. I remember the time when people said: “If only Milošević would fall.” Milošević fell. Koštunica and Đinđić came. Then people said: “If only Koštunica would go.” In the meantime, Đinđić was assassinated. Tadić came. Then people said: “If only Tadić would go.” After him came Dačić and Vučić. Today we hear: “If only Vučić would go.”

The experience of recent decades tells us something quite different: changing political actors by itself does not necessarily mean changing political direction. Because if ideas, patterns, and political reflexes remain the same, names are often changed much more easily than the future.

That is precisely why, in recent days, I have been carefully reading texts written by some young people in Serbia. One student writes about systemic yet almost invisible indoctrination — about the way generations inherit not only history, but also ready-made political frameworks through which they understand that history. She wrote a sentence that has stayed with me: that Milošević’s generation overthrew him, but that he successfully “hallucinated generations intravenously.”

I do not know if there is a more precise description of the problem I am trying to describe, because political systems do not survive through people — they survive through language.

And that brings me back to the students, and to my question: if students have already shown that they can push the boundaries of what is politically possible, why is it precisely on Kosovo that they accept in advance the boundaries others have set?

And when I speak about old patterns, I do not mean only old politicians. I also mean language — and the political framework through which Kosovo has been discussed for decades; ideas and formulations that did not originate with students, nor with this generation, but much earlier. We remember that language formed during the 1980s and 1990s through much of Serbia’s political, academic, and intellectual elite, where Kosovo was essentially removed from ordinary politics and placed into the realm of historical destiny and moral absolutes.

That is precisely why my question to students is not why they use symbols, but why, if they truly represent a new generation, they adopt almost the same framework through which Kosovo has been discussed for decades.

And even more importantly: if new politics adopts the same patterns in order to win — what exactly is it supposed to defeat?

Because if new politics, at its very first serious test, adopts the same language and the same political frameworks because it thinks no alternative is possible, then at what point does adaptation cease to be a political tactic and becomes a political surrender?

And during the most recent student gathering at Slavija, we once again heard talk of “betrayal of territory.” So are we witnessing the birth of a new politics or merely new voices of an old ideology?

Because even defeated ideologies rarely disappear. More often, they adapt to the times and merely change their carriers.

Sincerely,

Ilir

Students’ „Memorandum“ on Kosovo – politics beyond intellectual correctness